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Abstract
I compare the explicit and the implicit interest rates for the credits
acquired by 5,446 households using data from the Colombian Longi-
tudinal Survey of Wealth, Income, Labor and Land (ELCA). The
computation of the interest rate bias (IRB), defined as the difference
between the explicit and the implicit interest rates, reveals low levels
of financial literacy at different layers: (i) the information required
to calculate the interest rate bias is only available for 42.2% of the
credits, (ii) 17.4% of the computed interest rates are negative, (iii)
the distribution of the IRB reveals that 57.4% of the interest rates are
underestimated, whereas the other 42.8% are overestimated. Under-
estimated credits are more likely to appear on households with higher
levels of education, wealth and savings. The average (absolute) IRB
is 5.33 points, and is negatively correlated with acquiring the credit
in formal financial markets.
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1 Introduction
The standard models describing how economic agents make their consump-
tion, saving and borrowing decisions are supported on some assumptions
empirically arguable. The most notable and extensively studied are the lack
of willpower, the individual’s inconsistencies of time preferences and, the
aim of this work, the systematic misinterpretation of interest rates and other
financial information.
It is usually assumed that individuals are able to plan their consumption
trajectories for intermediate and long time horizons. Even if different mech-
anisms like insurances and precautionary savings are usually introduced in
these models to cope unexpected income shocks, they still neglect the irra-
tional but natural lack of willpower to deviate from the optimal consumption
path. The theoretical explorations of self-control and willpower (Be´nabou
and Tirole, 2004) have not been successfully connected to these models of
financial economic behavior (Jolls et al., 1998; Mullainathan and Thaler,
2000). There is a growing evidence in the use of commitment devices and
contracts with delayed costs. These products encourage the adoption of sav-
ings accounts in developing countries and the take-up of voluntary retirement
plans (Duflo and Saez, 2003; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; Ashraf et al., 2006).
However, they are the exception rather than the rule in a market plenty of
financial products not entirely understood by their consumers.
Another example are the discount factors often assumed in these models,
which are time insensitive. The introduction of exponential discount rates
implicitly assumes that the value of the reward decays in the same proportion
for each time period, independently of its temporal distance to the present.
However, preferences’ reversals with respect to the exponential discounting
model have been diagnosed since the mid-fifties (Strotz, 1956; Thaler, 1981).
As an alternative, it has been proposed the hyperbolic discounting model
(Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; Laibson, 1997; Frederick et al., 2002). Un-
like exponential discounting, hyperbolic preferences lead to a larger decay in
the value of reward per time unit in short time horizons than in long time
horizons.
The limitations of the exponential discounting model is extended to the
misrepresentation of the interest rates of financial products. The exponential
growth bias, a tendency to linearize exponential functions when they are
assessed intuitively, interferes with the accurate interpretation of interest
rates and leads to systematic underestimation of their values (Stango and
Zinman, 2009). This linearization, combined with the overconfidence bias
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), derives in poor financial decisions which are
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individually costly in the long run.
This problem has been tackled on two different fronts: with the regulation
on how financial information must be offered to consumers, and with the
encouragement of financial literacy programs. Regarding the disclosure of
financial information, the Truth in Lending Act signed in 1968 in the United
States require lenders to explicitly state the annual interest rates (APRs)
of their financial products. However, as shown by Shu (2006), borrowers
usually focus on other characteristics of the loan such as monthly payments
rather than on the interest rates. In the Colombian case, the country of
study, financial institutions are also requested to state the annual interest
rates according to the Financial Consumer Protection Regime, established
in 2009.
The first diagnoses of financial literacy for the American population ap-
pear in the mid-nineties (Bernheim, 1995, 1998). These initial evaluations
aimed to assess the financial planning skills of individuals close to their re-
tirement ages, connecting the shortage in retirement funds to low financial
literacy levels (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2009). Several financial literacy pro-
grams were designed to increase the understanding of basic concepts, aim-
ing to empower consumers in their decision-making process. Nevertheless,
there has been a lot of skepticism around the effectiveness of their educa-
tional impact (Willis, 2009). The issues of these programs are not limited to
the self-selection of participants in some characteristics as time preferences
(Meier and Sprenger, 2012), but they are extended to the difficulties in the
transmission of essential financial concepts such as interest rates.
A well-known evaluation of a financial education program with poor re-
sults is offered by Benartzi and Thaler (2007). This program was offered,
free of charge, to employees of the state of Illinois. To test the efficacy of the
program it was administered a test in a True/False format. The test results
were not particularly different from those that could have been obtained by
guessing, a fifty-fifty chance, before (54%) and after (55%) the intervention.
For the Colombian case, the “National Strategy on Financial and Eco-
nomic Education” (2010) presents a diagnosis of the financial literacy using
a set of questions adapted from the survey conducted in the United States.
The results reveal levels of financial literacy below the North American sam-
ple. This is particularly worrying having in mind that the survey was only
applied in Bogota´ to users of formal financial markets, suggesting an overes-
timation of financial literacy. In addition, it also reveals the need of survey
instruments targeting users of informal financial markets, a non-negligible
population in developing countries.
A different approach to measure the financial literacy is based on the
assessment of subjects’ comprehension of the contract terms of a hypothetical
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or their own financial products, and the comparison between the implicit and
explicit interest rates. One of the advantages of elicitating the implicit and
perceived interest rates, instead of using the standard tests with multiple
choice format, is that it allows retrieving a continuous measure of financial
literacy. In addition, it reduces the underestimation of the literacy rates
usually driven by subjects that guess between the set of possible answers.
Consider for instance the work of Bucks and Pence (2008), who compare
borrowers’ and lenders’ distributions of information regarding their mortgage
conditions. Borrowers’ responses are the perceived terms, while lenders’ re-
sponses are the contractual conditions of these credits. They show an aver-
age underestimation of interest rates. In addition, they provide evidence that
those subjects who are more likely to respond that they do not know the con-
tract terms are more exposed to large payment changes. Stango and Zinman
(2009) retrieve the implicit and perceived interest rates for a hypothetical
and a real credit, and they define the difference between interest rates as the
interest rate bias. They show that more biased households borrow more and
save less, but they are also more benefited from financial advice.
In this work I use a similar metric to the one proposed by Stango and
Zinman for all the credits reported in a sample of 5,446 Colombian house-
holds surveyed in the ELCA. This survey is representative at the urban level.
I compare the explicit interest rate with the implicit interest rate, which was
calculated using the information of the initial indebted amount as well as the
frequency and value of the installments. Debts reported in this survey com-
prise credits acquired in both formal and informal markets. In the category
“informal” are included credits with moneylenders, family and friends, and
they constitute more than one quarter of the total number of reports.
The benefits of using real credits instead of hypothetical loans to measure
financial literacy come at a cost. It is advantageous because it makes possible
the identification of patterns between the interest rate bias and the source
of the loan, whether it is a formal or informal credit, and also with the
destination of the amount borrowed. It is possible to detect, for instance, if
biases are on average lower for consumption credits than for housing loans.
Nonetheless, a caveat of this approach is the underlying assumption that
when subjects do not report the requested information it is only due to
financial illiteracy, forcing the exclusion of other motives such as lack of
trust in the enumerator.
Given the importance of informal mechanisms for credit access in devel-
oping countries, the main contribution of this work is to offer a comparison
of the interest rate bias between credits acquired in formal and informal
markets. Similar studies have been carried out with data from developed
countries. Therefore, our main contribution is the exploration of the differ-
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ential effects of the formal or informal source of the credit.
I provide evidence of the low levels of financial literacy at three different
layers of the information disclosure. First, in 57.2% of the reported credits it
is not possible to compute the interest rate bias. The most common missing
piece of information is the perceived interest rate, not reported in 41.1% of
all the credits. Second, among those that provide all the credit’s information,
17.4% of the computed interest rates are negative values. Third, the average
distance between the explicit and implicit monthly interest rates reaches 5.33
points. Unlike related works, not all the interest rates were underestimated:
42.8% of the credits correspond to overestimated interest rates. The source of
the credit, formal or informal market, is highly correlated with the magnitude
and the direction of the interest rate bias.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Evidence of finan-
cial literacy using survey questions and credit’s information is presented in
Section 2. Section 3 includes a description of the borrowing and saving be-
havior of surveyed households, as well as a depiction of the interest rate bias.
The results of the selection model use in the regression analysis are shown in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
2.1 Diagnoses of financial literacy in the United States
Different studies exposing the lack of financial literacy among the North
American population are reported in Lusardi and Mitchell (2009). A mod-
ule on financial education included in the University of Michigan’s Survey of
Consumers reveals that responders between 18 and 97 years old answer cor-
rectly about two-thirds of the 28 questions in True/False format (Hilgert and
Hogarth, 2002). With respect population-specific studies, there is evidence
of financial literacy assessments for population close to their retirement age
and high school students (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006; Mandell, 2008).
Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) analyze a module on financial literacy in-
cluded in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in 2004, a representative
sample at the national level of adults who were at least 50 years old. About
half of the respondents were able to correctly answer two basic questions
on financial literacy1. For this segment of the population the financial liter-
1Question 1: Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was
2% per year. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you
left the money to grow: (a) more than $102, (b) exactly $102, (c) less than $102?
Question 2: Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and
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acy levels are lower for women, African-Americans and Hispanics. Gender
differences are explored in depth in Lusardi and Mitchell (2008), showing
that women responding “I don’t know” to these two questions are less likely
to have made a retirement plan. In the case of Hispanic population, the
lower literacy levels are correlated with the lack of access to basic products
of financial markets such as banking accounts (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006).
The module on financial literacy from the HRS was also included in the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) fielded in 2007-2008. Lusardi
et al. (2010) find a positive correlation of financial literacy with cognitive
abilities, the parents’ experience in financial markets and the number of
peers planning to pursue higher education. In addition, it is particularly
worrying that the gender and racial gap in financial literacy persists among
the youngest proportion of the population, when the average exposition to
formal financial products does not greatly differ across groups.
Lusardi and Tufano (2009) surveyed a more specific set of skills of financial
knowledge, defined as debt literacy:
“debt literacy refers to the ability to make simple decisions regarding debt
contracts, applying basic knowledge about interest compounding to everyday
financial choices.”
They collected information on a set of three questions and demographic
information for 1,000 respondents of a phone-based survey across the United
States. They find that only a third of the respondents exhibit an acceptable
comprehension of concepts such as compound interest and basic notions on
the workings of credit cards. On average, surveyed individuals underestimate
the contracted interest rates, making them more likely to incur in high-
cost borrowing. Similar to the case of financial literacy, women, African-
Americans and Hispanics perform worst in the test compared to the average
population. For debt literacy, the group of divorced, separated and widowed
respondants are also performing below the average level.
2.2 The international evidence on financial literacy
A couple of studies perform a cross-country analysis of the financial literacy
levels. Jappelli (2010) uses a panel dataset combining information of the
IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) and human capital indicators
(e.g. PISA scores and college attendance) for 55 countries between 1995 and
2008. The financial literacy measure comes from a question included in the
WCY, a survey responded by business leaders in each one of these countries.
They were asked for their perception of the financial literacy among the
inflation was 2% per year. After 1 year, would you be able to buy: (a) more than, (b)
exactly the same as, or (c) less than today with the money in this account?
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country’s population on a scale from 1 to 10. The author finds that human
capital indicators are positively correlated with financial literacy, and that
inhabitants of countries with high mandated savings as part of their social
contributions are more financially illiterate. According to the author, this
is a consequence of having lower incentives for private wealth accumulation
under these regulatory schemes.
Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) offer an alternative analysis with a more
restrained number of countries, eight in total, with measures of financial
literacy based on respondents’ performance on a test rather than on the
businessmen’s perceptions. The test is the same administered in the HRS
in 2004. Two of their conclusions are related to Jappelli’s findings. First,
higher scores in math and science tests are correlated with more financial
literacy. Second, financial literacy increases if the country has experienced
pension privatization. In addition, they also show that financial illiteracy
is widespread across developed countries, and that people is more likely to
respond a question about inflation if their country recently experienced it.
Evidence of financial literacy levels within Latin America is scarce. For
the Chilean case, Mitchell et al. (2008) explore how the inefficient switching
patterns between private pension funds are negatively correlated with finan-
cial literacy. They analyze how a regulatory modification aimed to increase
the switching costs and to help users keep track of their contributions record,
by requesting the annual statement issued by their current pension fund in
case they wanted to switch to another one. They measure financial literacy
using years of education, years of experience in private pension funds and
a set of questions regarding the Chilean retirement regulations. The main
finding is that the regulatory modification reduced the number of switchings,
but the effect was driven by those financially literate.
For Colombia, the Central Bank applied a survey to measure economic
literacy and indebtedness in the Colombian households (Encuesta de Carga y
Educacio´n Financiera de los Hogares) in 2010. They borrowed the standard
questions from the HRS to evaluate financial literacy among the Colombian
population. Only 44% of the respondents correctly answered the three ques-
tions2. Compared to the 50% of respondents for the North American sample
reported in Lusardi and Mitchell (2009), the result for Colombia is particu-
larly poor if we take into account the sample selection bias. The survey was
conducted in Bogota´ only with users of formal financial markets; therefore,
it is very likely that extending its application to users of informal credits and
to less dense urban populations we would observe a drop in literacy rates.
2Question 3: Please tell me whether this statement is true or false. “Buying a single
company’s stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.”
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2.3 Financial literacy and disclosure of credit’s information
An alternative methodology to assess financial literacy uses information of
actual or hypothetical credits to compare implicit and perceived interest
rates. Bucks and Pence (2008) compare the distributions of self-reported
and actual mortgage terms matching borrower’s data from the Survey on
Consumer Finances (SCF) with lender’s data from two different sources, the
Residential Finance Survey and the Loan Performance Corporation. They
find a striking difference between those borrowers with fixed and adjustable
mortgage terms. The respondents with adjustable mortgage terms, those
more exposed to large change in payments, are more likely to report that
they don’t know their contract terms.
Stango and Zinman (2009) calculate the interest rate bias for hypothet-
ical and real credit information provided by the households surveyed in the
SCF of 1977 and 1983. In the hypothetical credit, the implicit interest rate
is calculated after eliciting the expected total repayment for a $1,000 usd
credit with twelve monthly installments. This implicit value is compared to
the perceived interest rate for the same hypothetical loan. They find system-
atic biases for hypothetical and actual loans, with more biased households
favoring short-sighted behaviors and getting more benefits from financial ad-
vice. In addition, they show that the underestimation of the interest rates
is explained by the exponential growth bias: a tendency to linearize expo-
nential functions when they are judged intuitively (Wagenaar and Sagaria,
1975).
Given the low levels of financial literacy and the lack of effectiveness of
the standard financial education programs, recent efforts have been redirected
towards the understanding of the most relevant pieces of credit’s information
to improve the decision-making process. Bertrand and Morse (2011) propose
a field experiment in which “more tangible” information than the APR is
provided to payday borrowers. The authors show that recalling the debt
costs in amount of dollars for different expiration periods of payday loans
is more effective in reducing the likelihood to borrow that the information
comparing payday loans’ interest rate with other credit sources (e.g. credit
cards and mortgages). Displaying this information in dollars is also more
effective that disclosing the probabilities and costs of refinancing the current
loan. Nevertheless, all the three informational treatments show to be more
effective than a self-control treatment using a savings planner.
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3 Credits and interest rate bias:
evidence for Colombia
3.1 Borrowing and saving behavior
I use data from the first wave of the Colombian Longitudinal Survey of
Wealth, Income, Labor and Land (ELCA), which was collected between April
and July 2010. The survey was conducted both at the urban and rural levels.
In this work I focus only on the urban sample, having a total of 5,446 surveyed
households which are representative at the national level.
The survey collects information on education, employment, health, hous-
ing, income and family composition, as well as detailed information on saving
and borrowing behavior. Each head of household was asked if they have any
of three different types of debt: loans, delays in payments (e.g. a debt with
a public utilities company) and debts with suppliers. The latter two are ex-
cluded from this study. Delays in payments, corresponding to 11.3% of the
reports, are excluded because they do not correspond to a borrower-lender
agreement with some mutually accepted terms, but rather they are the result
of a negative income shock or some household’s financial misplanning. Debts
with suppliers, corresponding to 12.6% of all the reports, are excluded given
that contractual terms are either available. One explanation for the absence
of contract terms is that delay in payments to the supplier is an intrinsic
part of the informal agreements for these entrepreneurial households with
low incomes.
The survey has a total of 4,252 reported loans, which means an aver-
age of 78 loans for each 100 households. Information on the initial indebted
amount, the value and periodicity of the installments and the interest rate
was collected for each declared loan. In addition, surveyed subjects were also
asked about the lender type and the destination of the debt. Sources and
destinations of these loans are reported in Table 1 for different socioeconomic
levels or strata. The shares for the different lender types evidence that infor-
mal markets are substituted by formal sources of credit as the socioeconomic
level increases. This table also shows an increasing proportion of credits to
acquire physical assets with the socioeconomic level, whereas for the “any
purpose” loans and repayment loans the proportion of credits is larger in the
poorest sectors of the population.
Surveyed households were also asked if they save or not, and if so, their
average monthly savings was asked too. In addition, they were also asked
about where do they keep their savings. This information is fundamental in
the study of financial literacy given that systematic differences between net
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Table 1: Lender type and loan destination per socioeconomic strata
Socioeconomic Strata Total
1 2 3 4
Lender type
Banks and financial institutions 40.21 52.28 60.43 66.71 53.94
Family and friends 20.61 15.30 11.63 8.96 14.55
Retail stores 14.55 12.59 10.88 6.25 11.80
Funds of employees 5.11 10.77 10.06 12.30 9.68
Payday lenders 15.56 6.76 4.79 1.84 7.29
Others 3.96 2.30 2.22 3.94 2.75
Destination of the debt
Consumer credit 25.29 24.28 28.29 26.68 25.89
Housing 13.42 20.70 17.90 27.80 19.29
Any purpose loan 19.35 16.97 12.73 9.06 15.33
Assets for own businessa 18.36 11.77 12.21 12.18 13.14
Health, education or recreation 8.44 9.61 9.66 6.02 9.04
Debts repayment 8.30 8.03 8.38 3.17 7.68
Vehicles and lands 3.46 5.11 7.59 13.63 6.43
Others 3.38 3.54 3.23 1.45 3.20
a Includes assets, inputs, physical installations and machinery.
savers and net borrowers may define if households are willing to incur in the
costs of processing financial information.
The saving behavior of households with and without credits is compared
in Table 2. This comparison is made for the head of household and his/her
partner. According to the statistical tests reported in the table, the percent-
age of respondents stating that they save part of their income is about 18%,
and it does not differ across groups. However, the average monthly savings
are slightly higher for the households reporting credits. Saving behavior from
the partner is also more frequent in households reporting debts. The same
pattern is observed for the average monthly savings.
Regarding the savings’ allocation, the proportion of subjects that keep
their savings in formal financial markets does not statistically differ between
households with and without debts. This is true for both the head of house-
hold and his partner. Nevertheless, heads of households with credits are more
likely to save in employees’ funds and less likely to save in cash with respect
to those heads of households that do not report any loan.
3.2 Disclosure of the credits’ contract terms
When the diagnosis of financial literacy is based on real credits rather than
on hypothetical credits unreported information becomes part of the analysis.
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Table 2: Saving behavior for households with/without credits
HH does HH does not χ2
have credits have credits statistic
(N = 2,618) (N = 2,649)
Household’s Head
Does he/she saves? 18.72 18.01 0.44
(Monthly savings|Saving) [cop]a 185,909 164,572 -1.83*
Where does he/she save?
Formal financial marketsb 30.41 30.82 0.02
Cash 37.55 50.52
Funds of employees 19.39 8.39
Head of Household’s Partner 70.86 60.44 63.33***
Does he/she saves? 15.82 12.02 10.28***
(Monthly savings|Saving) [cop]a 166,331 147,500 -1.69*
Where does he/she save?
Formal financial marketsb 26.62 31.25 1.22
Cash 48.12 50.52
Funds of employees 14.33 8.85
a A Mann-Whitney test was performed because the monthly savings were not normally distrib.
b All responses different from “formal financial markets” were pooled for the test.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
This approach is advantageous in the sense that an incomplete disclosure of
the contract terms is a signal of financial illiteracy usually not captured with
hypothetical questions used in most of the studies. However, lack of financial
knowledge may not be the only reason to unreport financial information.
Consider, for instance, the lack of trust on the enumerator. Subjects may
misreport their assets or indebtedness level if they do not feel comfortable
providing this information to the surveyer.
Table 3 reports that it was not possible to compute the interest rate bias
for 57.8% of the reported credits. It means that at least one of the credit’s
characteristics listed in this table was reported as not known. The most fre-
quently unreported characteristic is the perceived interest rate, unanswered
41.1% of the times. Conditional on giving a number as interest rate, for
21.6% of the credits the surveyed individual did not provide its periodicity.
The larger proportion of unreported interest rates is not surprising. As re-
marked in Shu (2006) and Bertrand and Morse (2011), people tend to focus
on more tangible aspects of their credit.
Other credit’s characteristics, such as the monthly installments, the re-
maining months to pay and the remaining amount to pay are unreported less
often. However, they still constitute between six and ten percent of the sam-
ple. The characteristic with a remarkingly low proportion of non-responded
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cases is the initial amount of debt, which was incomplete only in 40 out of
4,225 reports (0.99%).
Table 3: Percentage of debts with incomplete information
Characteristic % of debts without disclosed information
Full sample More than At most χ2
19 months old 19 months old statistic
Interest rate 41.13 46.73 35.25 44.10***
Periodicity of interest ratea 21.63 15.28 27.13 61.29***
Months to pay 10.20 10.19 10.21 0.58
Amount left to pay 8.60 9.59 7.55 9.42***
Monthly installment 6.01 6.10 5.92 0.79
Initial amount of debt 0.99 1.47 0.48 8.44***
Non-computable interest rate bias 57.78 59.08 56.41 0.42
a Conditional on disclosing the interest rate.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
I also explore if the time since the credit was acquired affect the rates of
response for the credit’s characteristics. One may think that subjects with
more recently acquired credits may be more likely to remember the tangible
and intangible contract’s conditions, whereas households with older credits
may be more likely to remember only the most tangible characteristics of
their credit. Credits in the sample are on average 30.1 months old, with a
median value of 19 months. The sample was splitted with respect to the
median age of the credit and the proportion of unreported information was
recalculated for each subsample, as shown in Table 3.
The interest rate, the indebted amount left to pay and the initial indebted
amount are less likely to be reported for older credits, whereas there are no
statistically significant differences for the expected duration of the credit and
the monthly installment. Surprisingly, the periodicity of the interest rate is
more likely to be reported in older credits. Given that this periodicity is asked
conditional on giving a vaule of the interest rate, a plausible explanation is
that the few households not reporting an interest rate for the most recent
credits are the more financially illiterate.
3.3 The interest rate bias
The interest rate bias (IRB hereafter) is defined as the difference between
the explicit and the implicit interest rate of a given credit. The explicit in-
terest rate is the value reported to the enumerator. The implicit interest rate
refers to the value calculated using additional information of the credit: the
initial indebted amount, the total time to pay, and the value and periodicity
of the installments. The periodicity of the interest rate was reported on a
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monthly basis in 83.4% of the (successfully) reported credits. For compara-
bility purposes, all the interest rates reported in a different time frequency
were converted to monthly values prior to the calculation of the IRB. In ad-
dition, it was also assumed that all the reports are interest rates in arrears,
not in advance.
The distributions of the interest rates, as well as the distribution of the
IRB, are displayed in Figure 13. In panel (a) are compared the distributions
for the explicit and implicit interest rates. Interest rates directly reported by
the surveyed subjects are highly concentrated in what behavioral scientists
call “prominent numbers” (Albers, 2002; Selten, 2002). In our sample, these
values are 1%, 1.5%, 2%, 2.5%, 3%, 5%, 10% and 20%. Despite the fact
that, in theory, this is a continuous distribution, the 48.6% of the reported
interest rates are concentrated in these eight “prominent” values.
Implicit interest rates follow a unimodal distribution without additional
peaks to match the prominent values listed above. The computed interest
rates evidence a source of inconsistency that will drive the IRB values away
from zero: 17.35% of the computed rates are negative. These values below
zero reveal a peculiarity in the disclosure of contract terms: misreports of
information are not exclusively related to the interest rate. In order to obtain
negative interest rates, some tangible characteristics of the contract such as
the installments or the indebted amount must be misreported in such a way
that the total repayment of the debt is below the initial borrowed amount.
In Stango and Zinman (2009) is assumed that contract terms different
from the interest rate are correctly reported. This assumption, guaranteeing
that the IRB measures a bias of the perceived interest rate, is not very plau-
sible for the Colombian sample used in this work. Technically, the difference
between interest rates cannot be considered a bias if the implicit interest
rate is also a noisy measure. For clarity purposes, and with a slight abuse of
notation, I will keep calling this difference the IRB in the remaining of the
document.
Panel (b) from Figure 1 displays the distribution of the IRB. The mean
value of the IRB is 0.62 points (0.0062) and its median value is -0.58 points
(-0.0058). In addition, values between -10 and 10 points (-0.10 and 0.10)
represent 85.7% of the sample. A negative IRB value means that the cost
of the credit is underestimated, and it corresponds to 57.4% of the observa-
tions. This percentage increases to 69.8% if the credits with negative implicit
3For legibility purposes, explicit and implicit interest rates below -10 points (2.2% of
the sample) and above 35 points (3.9% of the sample) were excluded from the Figure.
Most of the observations with implicit interest rates above 35 points correspond to payday
lenders with interest rates set on a daily basis. Given the short periodicity, the conversion
to a monthly interest rate is very sensitive to small inconsistencies.
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Figure 1: Distributions of interest rates and IRB
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Panel (a): Distribution of explicit and implicit interest rates. Panel (b): Distribution of the interest rate bias (IRB).
interest rates are excluded from the sample.
The IRB suggests an overestimation of the credit’s cost in more than
forty percent of the observations. Compared to Stango and Zinman (2009)
the percentage of reports in which the cost of the credit was overestimated
is very high. In their sample, less than 2 percent of the credits’ cost turned
out to be overestimated.
Given the large proportion of households that perceive their loans as more
expensive than they actually are, I look for systematic differences between
respondents that underestimated and overestimated their interest rates. Ta-
ble 4 reports the mean differences for a set of variables related to household’s
physical and human capital that do not directly appear on the calculations of
the IRB. Households that underestimate (with respect to those overestimat-
ing) the interest rates are wealthier, more educated, and save more money
each month. Borrowing experience, captured through the number of reported
credits per household, does not differ across groups.
The positive relationship between the wealth index and underestimating
the interest rate can be explained by the elasticity of the perceived price of the
credit with respect to the household’s wealth. Poorer households are budget
constrained, and thus, they have lower bargaining power when they request
a credit. If this is true, poorer households are more likely to accept an offered
credit, even if they perceived the contractual terms as disadvantageous. A
well-known example are the credits acquired with payday lenders.
On the other hand, wealthier households have the chance to be more
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Table 4: Differences between households with overestimated and
underestimated interest rates
Variable Overestimated Underestimated Statistic
interest rate interest rate
Formal financial marketa [%] 55.85 94.92 384.86***
Wealth index [standardized] -0.001 0.434 -9.93***
Education head of HH [years] 9.15 10.42 -5.49***
Head of HH savesa [%] 76.63 73.39 3.3
Head of HH’s monthly savings [cop] 165,718 220,117 -3.07***
Credits reported by the HH 2.40 2.28 0.49
a A χ2 test is performed for categorical variables.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
selective with the offered credit conditions, favoring the selection of credits
that seem cheaper than they actually are. The differences in the percentage of
credits acquired in formal markets across underestimated and overestimated
interest rates support this explanation: 94.9% of the underestimations occur
with credits in the formal market, whereas for overestimated interest rates
its proportion only reaches 55.9%.
4 Regression Analysis
4.1 Factors correlated with IRB and differences between under-
estimated and overestimated credits
In the previous section was mentioned that the implicit interest rate was only
computable for 42.2% of the reports. The least reported characteristic was
the perceived interest rate, suggesting that the lack of financial literacy is
directly related to an underreport of the contract terms. I estimate a trun-
cated model that corrects for the potential sample selection bias, dampening
the endogeneity problems of the model.
Despite the usefulness of the selection equation to control for systematic
differences between fully reported and incomplete contract terms, the simul-
taneity bias due to the relationship between financial literacy and access to
formal markets prevails in the main equation of the model. A direct conse-
quence of this issue is that the estimated coefficients cannot be interpreted
as causal effects. However, the robustness of several regressions shown in this
section will contribute to the understanding of the sources of the biases in
the perception of the interest rates among the Colombian urban population.
The truncated model is estimated using a two step procedure. In the first
step a Probit model is used to estimate the probability of giving a complete
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report of the requested contract terms. If it was possible to compute the IRB
of a given credit, it will be considered a “successful report”. The second stage
consists on regressing the absolute value of the IRB on a set of covariates
including the inverse Mill’s ratio obtained after the Probit estimation. I use
the ‖IRB‖ given the large fraction of overestimated credits in the sample.
The inverse Mill’s ratio, the ratio of the probability density function to the
cumulative density function of the distribution of the predicted probability
from the Probit model, is introduced in the main regression to account for the
potential sample selection bias. This procedure is known as the Heckman’s
sample selection model (Heckman, 1979).
The coefficients for the full sample, and also for the separate subsamples
of underestimated and overestimated interest rates, are reported on Table 5.
For the full sample and each subsample are shown the OLS results and
the estimates for each stage of the sample selection model. In the first stage
of the selection equation I directly report the marginal effects calculated at
the mean value of all the covariates. For simplicity purposes, the coefficients
in the main equation will be interpreted in terms of points of interest instead
of the simple difference between interest rates.
Columns (1) to (3) report the results for the full sample. OLS estimates
are very similar to the main equation of the truncated model, suggesting
the absence of a selection bias effect under this specification. The small and
statistically insignificant value of λ confirms this intuition. Each additional
month since the acquisition of the credit slightly increases the IRB. In ad-
dition, having a credit in the formal market is correlated with an average
reduction of 8.2 points in the IRB. It is important to make clear that this
estimate only remarks the strong correlation between formal markets and
financial literacy captured through the IRB, but it cannot be interpreted as
a causal relationship. The access to formal financial markets may help re-
ducing financial illiteracy, but those more financially literate could also be
more likely to access to formal financial markets.
Although the other covariates are not statistically significant in the main
regression, most of them have a significant effect in the selection equation.
The participation in formal markets also has an important effect, increasing
the probability of a successful report in 12.9 percentage points. Older cred-
its are less likely to be successfully reported. Specifically, each month old
reduces the likelihood of a full report in 0.14 percentage points. An addi-
tional credit’s characteristic introduced in the selection equation is the initial
indebted amount. This value cannot be introduced into the main equation
because it is part of the IRB calculation, but since it was reported in more
than 99% of the credits it could be introduced into the selection equation.
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For each million of Colombian pesos (cop)4 initially indebted, the likelihood
of a successful report increases 0.28 percentage points.
Schooling years and savings behavior also have an effect on the selec-
tion equation despite that their effects were not different from zero in the
main equation. An additional year of education increases the likelihood of
a successful report in 0.82 points, and having monthly savings increase this
likelihood in 4.27 points. Two additional variables only included in the selec-
tion equation are the head of household’s age and if he/she has a partner or
not. Each year old has a positive effect of 0.21 points5, and having a partner
increases this likelihood in 6.41 points.
I complete the same estimation for the subsamples with underestimated
and overestimated credits separately. In the subsample of underestimated
credits, for all the observations with an IRB strictly greater than zero this
value was reset as non-computable, pooling these observations with the un-
successfully reported credits. As a consequence, the Probit regression in the
sample selection model is now interpreted as the probability of underestimate
the IRB with respect to overestimating this bias or providing an incomplete
report. The marginal effects, reported in column (6), reveal similar results
to the selection equation with the whole sample. In terms of direction and
significance of the coefficients, the only difference is that the head of house-
hold’s saving behavior and his/her report of having a couple are no longer
significant. In addition, the λ parameter remains non-significant.
Despite the minor changes in the selection equation, the coefficients in
the main equation drastically differ from those in columns (1) and (2). The
variable indicating that a credit was acquired in the formal market is no
longer significant, which could be related to the fact that almost 95% of the
underestimated interest rates belong to these markets.
On the other hand, variables that were not significant in the estimation
with the whole sample are now strongly correlated with the IRB. Households
reporting a savings behavior have, on average, an IRB 0.76 points lower.
Wealthier households show a slight tendency to be more biased, as one addi-
tional standard deviation in the Wealth index is correlated with an increase
in the IRB of 0.66 points. This result goes in line with the hypothesis of the
elasticity to the perceived price of the credits described in Subsection 3.3:
physical capital allow households to be more selective in the accepted credit
conditions, leading them to acquire credits that they perceive as “cheaper”
4At the time of the survey the exchange rate oscillates between 1,850 and 1,950 cop for
1 usd.
5In an alternative specification was also included a quadratic term for the age aiming to
capture life-cycle characteristics, this variable was not statistically significant and actually
reduced the significance of the linear term.
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even when these are not. Finally, an additional year of education increases
the IRB in 0.08 points. Although this effect is statistically significant, its
economic relevance is limited: it would be necessary seventeen years of edu-
cation to raise the IRB in a third of its average value for the underestimated
credits.
For the subsample of overestimated credits all the negative IRB values
were reset as non-computable, the opposite procedure than for the subsample
of underestimated interest rates. As in the previous case, the interpretation
of the selection equation differs from the interpretation with the whole sam-
ple. I find again that the coefficients in the selection equation are close to
the estimates in column (3), although there are two particular exceptions.
First, for credits acquired in a formal market the likelihood to report an
overestimated credit decreases 9.36 percentage points. Second, an additional
standard deviation in the wealth index reduces the likelihood in 1.97 per-
centage points.
One may think that the negative effects of formal markets and wealth
in the selection equation may be driven by the fact that credits with under-
estimated IRB, whose value was reset as non-computable, are contributing
in the Probit model to the failure case (when the IRB is not observable).
To address this concern, instead of pooling the underestimated credits with
the non-computable IRBs, I dropped all the credits with an IRB < 0 from
the sample. The results from this alternative calculation are shown in the
column (4) in Table A.1. It is observed that the negative effects of formal
markets and wealth are robust to this different specification.
Conditional on reporting an overestimated IRB, the coefficient for market
type is similar to the value found for the whole sample. Formal markets are
correlated with an average decrease of 9.14 points in the IRB, an effect larger
than the one displayed on columns (1) and (2). Regarding the wealth index,
its effect is statistically significant and goes in the opposite direction than
in the analysis with the subsample of underestimated IRBs. An additional
standard deviation in the wealth index is correlated with a reduction of 1.11
points in the value of the IRB.
The negative effect of wealth is compatible with the findings from model
(3) and (4) and the hypothesis of the elasticity of the perceived interest rate,
as those financially constrained households are more likely to accept what
they perceive as less favorable contract terms if they have restrained access
to other financial alternatives.
19
4.2 Differences by destination of the debt
In this subsection I explore the heterogeneities in the value of the IRB across
different debts’ destinations. Consider for instance the housing credits, which
may have larger values of the IRB due to the more extended duration of these
credits as well as potential variations in contract terms over time (Bucks and
Pence, 2008). Another example could be the credits acquired to repay a
preexisting debt, for which we could also expect an IRB above the average if
financial misplanning is correlated with debt literacy.
I add to the econometric specification a set of indicator variables for the
different credit destinations, which is listed in Table 1. Given that in Table
5 the coefficient of the inverse Mill’s ratio was not statistically significant
for the different specifications, the selection equation and the main equation
were estimated separately. Results of this alternative specification are shown
in Table 6.
In these regressions the omitted category were the consumer credits. The
comparison of the different credit’s destinations with consumer credits is
useful not only because is the most popular type of credit with 25.9% of
the reports, but also because they exhibit the lowest percentage variation
between socioeconomic strata. OLS results in column (1) show that the IRB
is about 2.1 points higher for consumer credits compared to destinations
such as credits for housing and to acquire assets for business. The IRB for
consumer credits is also larger than in the case of any purpose loans and
health, education and recreation credits. I find no difference in the average
IRB between credits aiming to repay older debts and consumer credits.
In column (2) is shown that for some credit’s destinations is more likely
to have a complete report than for others. Consumer credits are less likely to
be successfully reported with respect to other destinations, exceptuating the
credits for vehicles and land. This effect is particularly larger if the credit
is requested to buy assets for own business or debts’ repayment, reaching
an increase in the likelihood of a successful report of 15.6 and 16.1 per-
centage points respectively. Although the average IRB tends to be larger
for debts’ repayment compared to the vast majority of other credit’s desti-
nations, households reporting these repayment loans are the more likely to
disclose all the required information to compute the implicit interest rate.
A potential concern with the results in columns (1) and (2) is that the
reported correlations for the different destinations are driven by whether the
credit was acquired in a formal or informal financial market. For instance,
one might be worried that the lower biases in the credits requested for hous-
ing, vehicles and lands might reflect the larger participation of banks and
other financial institutions. To address this issue, the estimation is repeated
20
Table 6: IRB (absolute value) as a function of the destination of the debt.
Omitted category are consumer credits.
Dependent variable: OLS Selection OLS Selection
‖IRB‖ (marginal) (marginal)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Formal financial market -0.0767*** 0.134*** -0.0774*** 0.0859**
(0.0061) (0.0184) (0.0130) (0.0336)
Head of HH saves -0.0056 0.0458** -0.0066* 0.0489**
(0.0036) (0.0197) (0.0035) (0.0197)
Housing -0.0211*** 0.118*** -0.0411* 0.0555
(0.0055) (0.0250) (0.0243) (0.0513)
× Formal market 0.0230 0.0818
(0.0246) (0.0574)
Any purpose loan -0.0228*** 0.0761*** -0.0502*** -0.0412
(0.00502) (0.0240) (0.0177) (0.0547)
× Formal market 0.0305* 0.147**
(0.0182) (0.0608)
Assets own business -0.0207*** 0.156*** -0.0073 0.139***
(0.0057) (0.0245) (0.0182) (0.0472)
× Formal market -0.0169 0.0251
(0.0186) (0.0553)
Health/Education/Recreation -0.0254*** 0.126*** -0.0400** 0.102**
(0.0060) (0.0286) (0.0170) (0.0509)
× Formal market 0.0198 0.0315
(0.0176) (0.0615)
Debts’ repayment -0.0019 0.161*** 0.0160 0.174***
(0.0091) (0.0291) (0.0219) (0.0462)
× Formal market -0.0309 -0.0380
(0.0227) (0.0600)
Vehicles/Land -0.0155** 0.0475 0.0465 -0.178
(0.00692) (0.0353) (0.0718) (0.117)
× Formal market -0.0646 0.256**
(0.0720) (0.122)
Constant 0.120*** 0.121***
(0.0074) (0.0123)
Observations 1,717 4,168 1,717 4,168
R-squared 0.213 0.227
Additional variables included in the main and the selection equation: years of education,
wealth index and months since the credit was acquired. In the selection equation are also
included the head of household’s age, if he/she has a partner, number of reported credits and
their initial indebted amount. Standard errors in parenthesis. Robust standard errors computed
for OLS regressions. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
including interaction terms between the different debt destinations and the
dichotomic variable indicating if the credit was acquired in a formal market.
21
Results are shown in columns (3) and (4) in the same table.
The larger bias for consumer credits with respect to credits for vehicles,
land and assets shown in column (1) disappears. For the other credit’s des-
tinations, housing, health, education and recreation, and any purpose loans
the magnitude of the coefficients increases considerably. Almost all the in-
teraction terms, with a single exception, are statistically insignificant. In the
case of any purpose loans requested on formal markets the IRB is on average
3.05 points larger than for a consumer credit. In addition, saving behavior
is correlated with a reduction in the IRB under this specification.
The selection equation, in column (4), reveals that the likelihood of pro-
viding a succesfull report in the case of any purpose loans and credits for
vehicles and land is highly correlated with formal markets. In addition,
housing credits and its interaction term are not statistically significant under
this specification.
4.3 Robustness checks
The results shown along this section may raise a concern given that in the
measure of the IRB the explicit and the implicit interest rates may be biased.
I propose in this section two different exercises to address this issue. First, I
replicate the regression analysis from Table 5 setting all the negative implicit
interest rates equal to zero. Second, I replicate all the estimations with
the subsample of credits for which the periodicity of the interest rate was
reported on a monthly basis.
The first exercise aims to determine to which extent the correlations with
the IRB are only driven by the credits in which a negative interest rate was
computed. If this is the case, which occured in 17.4% of the full reported
credits, the IRB will systematically lead to larger underestimations of the
interest rate. After setting the implicit interest rate in zero it is possible to
determine the drop in the magnitude of the coefficients with respect to Table
5. The larger the drop, the more relevant was this mistake in the whole
result.
The coefficients from this estimation are reported in Table A.2. As ex-
pected, the selection equation is nearly identical6 to the regression in Subsec-
tion 4.1. With respect to the main equation the signs of all the coefficients
remain the same, although the coefficient’s magnitudes decreased in about
twenty percent. There is very few variation in this magnitude drop between
coefficients. For instance, the effect of a credit in the formal market dropped
6There are some slight differences in the third digit of the coefficients due to a slight
change in the sample size.
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from 8.18 to 6.59 negative points in the IRB. On the other hand, the mag-
nitude of the effects of the wealth index increased. An additiontal standard
deviation reduces the IRB in 1.58 points, 0.47 more than in Table 5.
This comparison shows that the results were not mainly driven by the fact
that the computed interest rate was negative in about one of every six credits
fully reported. After proposing a correction to these mistakes, coefficients in
the main equation remain close to the eighty percent of their initial value.
The second exercise consists on an alternative estimation with the sub-
sample of credits directly reported on a monthly basis, which correspond to
83.4% of the observations for which was possible to compute the implicit rate.
The purpose of this exercise is twofold. First, to check that the correlations
with the IRB are not driven by very large biases in the remaining 16.6%
of credits, in which the additional transformation of the interest rate may
increase the noise of the IRB value. Second, to determine if, conditional on
reporting the interest rate on a monthly basis, the patterns in the selection
equation differ from the whole subsample.
The OLS coefficients for the main equation and the marginal effects after
the Probit estimation of the selection equation are reported in Table A.3.
Regarding the main equation, coefficients in columns (1), (3) and (5) are
very robust with respect to the regressions in Table 5, except for the head
of household’s saving behavior. Conditional on reporting a monthly interest
rate, the IRB for households with periodical savings is on average 0.66 lower
than for those without them. According to the estimates in column (5), the
effect seems to be driven by those cases with overestimated interest rates. In
this subset of observations, in which the IRB > 0, the IRB is 1.03 lower for
households reporting saving behavior.
The effect of formal financial markets is robust to the subsample of credits
with a monthly interest rate. However, the coefficient presents a drop of
about 16% with respect to the original estimation. One potential explanation
of this drop is that interest rates reported in a higher frequency that per
month are more usual in informal credit markets. A particular example are
the daily interest rates set by payday lenders, in which small deviations from
the effective interest rate may lead to larger biases in its transformation to
a monthly rate.
Regarding the selection equation, the marginal effects evidence system-
atic differences with respect to the model in Table 5. The most notable
variation is the loss of statistical significance for the head of household’s age
and schooling years. In addition, the marginal effects for the joint sample
of underestimated and overestimated credits also reveal that acquiring the
credit in formal markets is no longer having a positive impact on the likeli-
hood to report the credit. Although the general pattern is a loss of predictive
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power of the different covariates included the Probit model, for the overes-
timated interest rates the negative effect of formal markets in the likelihood
of providing a successful report goes from -9.36 to -23.6 percentage points.
5 Concluding remarks
I offer a diagnosis of the financial literacy in Colombia using information
of the household’s real credits instead of the standard literacy tests. An
advantage of this approach, particularly in a developing country, is that it
allows to explore the perceptual differences in the cost of lending between
credits acquired in formal and informal markets.
The initial aim of this work was to compute the implicit interest rate of
each reported credit and compare it with the perceived interest rate using the
Interest Rate Bias (IRB). Nevertheless, the comparision was only possible to
make for 42.2% of the credits. For the remaining observations there was at
least one missing piece of information required to calculate the IRB. The
most frequently unreported characteristic was the perceived interest rate,
a missing value in 71.2% of the unsuccessfully reported credits. This is a
first piece of evidence of low levels of financial literacy among the Colombian
population.
The second piece of evidence in detriment of the financial literacy levels is
the non-negligible proportion of credits with a negative implicit interest rates,
which happened in 17.4% of the credits successfully reported. It means that
when respondents were asked about the initial value and date of acquisition
of the credit as well as their installments, they provide information such that
the total amount to pay was less than the initial indebted amount.
Regarding the distribution of the IRB, it is shown that the mean and me-
dian values are 0.0062 and -0.0058 respectively. A total of 57.4% of the credits
are underestimated, a low proportion compared to the 98% in Stango and
Zinman’s sample for developed countries. I found that households that un-
derestimate the interest rate are wealthier, more educated and report higher
savings. These characteristics support the hypothesis of the elasticity to the
perceived price of the credit with respect to the wealth level. In few words,
poorer households are more likely to agree on contract conditions even if they
consider it disadvantageous, whereas richer households are more likely to ac-
cept credits that they perceived as “cheaper”. This third piece of evidence of
the financial literacy levels, the largest and most studied in this work, show
the existence of systematic differences between credits acquired in formal and
informal markets that were analyzed in depth using a regression analysis.
The regression analysis took into account two potential problems of en-
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dogeneity. First, it was initially expected a sample selection bias under the
assumption that respondents who do not successfully report the information
about their credit have lower levels of financial literacy. Regression results
show that the parameter capturing the sample selection effect was not statis-
tically significant in any of the regressions. The second endogeneity problem
was the relationship between the IRB and the credit’s source, whether it was
a formal or informal financial market. The main problem in this case is that
it is not possible to establish a causal relationship: access to informal mar-
kets may lead to larger biases; but it is also possible that households with
low financial literacy, reflected in a larger IRB, are more likely to be excluded
from formal financial markets.
This simultaneity problem implies that coefficients from the regression
are biased and cannot be directly interpreted. Given this constraint, I limit
the analysis to a comparison of coefficients between regressions for different
samples. The comparison between the subsamples of underestimated and
overestimated credits provide additional support to the selection of credits
according to the household’s wealth and their bargaining power. Acquiring
the credit is no longer significant for underestimated credits, but the mag-
nitude of the coefficient increases for overestimated credits. In addition, the
sign of the wealth coefficient is opposite in the regressions of these subsam-
ples.
The regression analysis also includes some robustness checks. They show
that the effects are not only driven by the credits with a negative implicit
interest rate nor by the credits reported with a periodicity different to the
monthly basis.
Future research in developing countries should aim to combine standard
questionnaires of financial literacy with methods including the analysis of real
financial information from the households, and perhaps shoudl consider the
introduction of framing effects to explore in depth the systematic differences
in the perception of formal and informal credits.
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Appendix
A.1 Additional Tables
Table A.1: IRB (absolute value) as a function of household’s characteristics.
Overestimated (underestimated) credits were dropped from the subsample of
underestimated (overestimated) credits.
Underestimated (IRB ≤ 0) Overestimated (IRB > 0)
Dependent variable: Truncated model Truncated model
‖IRB‖ Main Selection Main Selection
equation (marginal) equation (marginal)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Formal financial market -0.0013 0.337*** -0.0894*** -0.0533***
(0.0147) (0.0221) (0.0081) (0.0167)
Education [years] 0.0008* 0.0065*** -0.0003 0.0055***
(0.0004) (0.0018) (0.0008) (0.0018)
Months since credit 0.0004*** -0.0007*** 0.0002 -0.0015***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Wealth index [standard] 0.0065*** 0.0054 -0.0106*** -0.0232**
(0.0021) (0.0092) (0.0039) (0.0091)
Head of HH saves -0.0076** 0.0279 -0.0071 0.0389**
(0.0037) (0.0191) (0.0083) (0.0196)
Age [years] 0.0017** 0.0015**
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Head of HH’s Partner 0.0363** 0.0657***
(0.0165) (0.0168)
Reported HH’s credits 0.0074 -0.0028
(0.0049) (0.0046)
Initial amount of debt 0.0032*** 0.0005
(0.0007) (0.0008)
Constant 0.0211 0.139***
(0.0308) (0.0468)
λ (inverse Mills ratio) 0.0009 -0.0120
(0.0147) (0.0373)
Observations 3,436 3,436 3,183 3,183
Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table A.3: IRB (absolute value) as a function of household’s characteristics.
Explicit interest rates not reported on a monthly basis were excluded from the
sample.
Full sample Underestimated Overestimated
OLS Selection OLS Selection OLS Selection
(marginal) (marginal) (marginal)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Formal financial market -0.0673*** 0.0199 -0.0029 0.358*** -0.0764*** -0.236***
-0.0047 (0.0254) (0.0066) (0.0267) (0.00537) (0.0195)
Education [years] 0.0002 0.0034 0.0008* 0.0016 -0.0006 0.0017
-0.0003 (0.00256 (0.0004) (0.0024) (0.0005) (0.0023)
Months since credit 0.0002*** -0.0023*** 0.0002*** -0.0005 0.0002** -0.0020***
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Wealth index [standard] -0.0002 -0.0019 0.0059** 0.0196 -0.0068** -0.0185
(0.0020) (0.0137) (0.0026) (0.0129) (0.0028) (0.0121)
Head of HH saves -0.0066** 0.0641** -0.0056 0.0136 -0.0103** 0.0486**
(0.0031) (0.0264) (0.0039) (0.0240) (0.0049) (0.0227)
Age [years] 0.0006 0.0009 -0.0004
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Head of HH’s Partner 0.0699*** 0.0374* 0.0350*
(0.0224) (0.0215) (0.0204)
Reported HH’s credits -0.0026 -0.0002 -0.0021
(0.0065) (0.0062) (0.0057)
Initial amount of debt 0.0027*** 0.0031*** -0.0009
(0.00105) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Constant 0.0973*** 0.0244*** 0.112***
(0.0057) (0.0074) (0.0071)
Observations 1,434 2,329 794 2,329 640 2,329
R-squared 0.217 0.042 0.343
Standard errors in parenthesis. Robust standard errors computed for OLS regressions.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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